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ADJUSTING LOSSES AMONG JOINT TORTFEASORS IN
VEHICULAR COLLISION CASES*
A LONG-STANDING controversy exists over the common-law rule forbidding
courts to allocate damages among joint tortfeasors.1 The issue is presently
significant because of the growing number of vehicular collisions which stem
from the concurring negligence of two or more operators and produce injury
to third parties.2 This type of situation evokes three fundamental and some-
times competing policies. The first would enshrine moral fault as the sole
criterion of liability: every wrongdoer should pay for all injury proximately
caused by his tortious conduct, and for no more.3 Exponents of this approach
*Shapiro v. Gulf, M. & O.R.R., 256 F.2d 193 (7th Cir. 1958).
1. See James, Contribution Among Joint Tortfeasors: A Pragmatic Criticism, 54
HARv. L. REv. 1.156 (1941) ; Gregory, Contribution Among Joint Tortfeasors: A Defense,
id. at 1170.
The rule against contribution was first set forth in Merryweather v. Nixan, 8 T.R.
186, 101 Eng. Rep. 1337 (K.B. 1799). The common-law rationale was that the law
should not assist wrongdoers. Reath, Contribution Between Persons Jointly Charged for
Negligence-Merryweather v. Nixan, 12 HAv. L. REv. 176 (1898). Although the rule
seems first to have been applied only in cases of intentional wrongs or torts involving
a high degree of moral turpitude, it has since been extended to cover merely negligent
torts. PRoSsER, TORTs 247-48 (2d ed. 1955). Expansion of the definition of "joint tort"
has also given the rule a much broader application. Originally, "joint tort" referred to
wrongs perpetrated by two or more persons acting in concert. Today, independent con-
curring torts by parties having no prior relationship constitute "joint torts," provided
only that the resulting damage is indivisible. Prosser, Joint Torts and Several Liability,
25 CALIF. L. Rv. 413, 432-33 (1937) ; 1 HAI YR & JAMFs, TORTS § 10.2, at 715 (1956).
The vigor of recent opposition to the rule against contribution may be partly explained
by this increase in the breadth of its application. So long as the rule applied only to
morally culpable parties acting in concert, it was in accord with popular notions of jus-
tice; but when applied to all torts irrespective of the relationship of the parties, it departs
from what to some commentators is the community sense of morality.
2. "If present trends continue, it may be expected that one person out of every ten
in this country may be killed or injured in a motor vehicle accident within a period of
fifteen years." MCFARLAIND, MOORE & WARREN, HUMAN VARIABLES IN MOTOR VEHICLE
AccmmrTs 99 (Harvard School of Public Health 1955). Motor vehicle accident deaths
have increased 43% since 1928, and motor vehicle accidents accounted for 40,000 deaths
and 1,400,000 nonfatal injuries in 1956. NATIONAL SAFETY COUNCIL, ACCIDENT FACTS 5
(1.957). The total estimated cost of 1956 motor vehicle accidents is $5 billion. Id. at 13.
Collisions accounted for 25,350 deaths and 1,125,000 nonfatal injuries in 1956. Id. at 58.
3. See HOL3XEs, TE CoMMoN LAW 108-10, 144-46 (1881); PRossER, TORTS 15 (2d
ed. 1955) ; Ames, Law and Morals, 22 HARv. L. REv. 97 (1908).
The foundation of liability is similar under civil-law systems. E.g., 1 MAZEAUD,
MAZEAUD, & TUNC, TRATL TnoRIQuE ET PRATIQUE DE LA RtsPONSABILITP, CIVILE §§
82-95 (5th ed. 1958). "[W]e are still ruled by la grande regle that there is no civil
liability without fault." Id. § 95, at 99.
For a vigorous attack on recent trends toward liability without fault, see Pound,
Law if the Service State, 36 A.B.A.J. 977 (1950).
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oppose the common-law rule, favor compulsory contribution among joint tort-
feasors, and urge that damages be apportioned among culpable parties in ac-
cordance with their relative degrees of fault.4
A second approach would effect "loss distribution." 5 Its advocates contend
that, in most cases, disparities in degree of moral fault are either not present
or do not admit of sufficiently precise determination to ensure an equitable
allocation of damages." They argue further that vehicular collisions often stem
4. E.g., GREGORY, LEGIsLAVE Loss DIsTuUToN IN NEGLIGENCE ACTIONS (1936) ;
PROSSER, TORTS 248-49 (2d ed. 1955); N.Y. LAW REVISION COmm'N, REPORT, RECOm-
aIENDATIONS AND STUDIES 27 (1952) ; Bohlen, Contribution and Indemnity Between Tort-
fcasors, 21 CORNELL L.Q. 552 (1936); Commissioners' Prefatory Note, Uniform Cor -
tribution Among Tortfeasors Act, 9 U.L.A. 230-32 (1957); Stevens, A Proposal for
Contribution Among Joint Tortfeasors in Ohio, 3 W. RES. L. REv. 50 (1951).
5. For general discussions of loss distribution, see, e.g., 2 HARPER & JAMES, TORTS
§ 11.1-14.16 (1956); EHRENZWEiG, NEGLIGENCE WITHOUT FAULT (1951); Friedmann,
Social Insurance and the Principles of Tort Liability, 63 HAuv. L. REv. 241 (1949);
Green, The Individual's Protection Under Negligence Law: Risk Sharing, 47 Nw. U.L.
REv. 751 (1953) ; Gregory, Loss Distribution in Torts, 45 VA. L. REV. 63 (1959). For
an English view, see Compensation for Accidents, 102 SOL. J. 729 (1958). In the civil
law, the loss distribution approach, referred to as the "risk theory" of jurisprudence, has
comparable policy objectives. 1 MAZEAUD, MzAZEAUD & TuN, op. cit. supra note 3, §§
77-86.
One commentator has recently made an extended attempt to deny that moral fault
and loss distribution are distinct approaches and to harmonize both under a concept of
"conditional fault." Keeton, Conditional Fault in the Law of Torts, 72 HARv. L. REV. 401
(1959). This attempted synthesis emphasizes that elements of both moral fault and loss
distribution exist side by side in contemporary tort rules and decisions and that the loss
distribution approach has an essentially moral foundation. But "conditional fault" as an
analytical tool may produce new complexities of its own and tend to obscure basically
competing policy choices which must be made.
Loss distribution has been implemented in actual practice by the dilution of the fault
requirement and emasculation of the contributory negligence doctrine in collision cases.
See Nixon, Changing Riles of Liability in Automobile Accident Litigation, 3 LAW &
CONTEUP. PRoB. 476, 490 (1936) ("definite trend away from the strict fault concepts of
the common law") ; Prosser, Comparative Negligence, 51 MICH. L. REV. 465, 469 (1953)
("Every trial lawyer is well aware that juries often do in fact allow recovery in cases
of contributory negligence . . ").
The trend away from fault liability in collision cases is also manifest abroad. See,
e.g., Compensation for Accidents, 102 SOL. J. 729, 784-85 (1958) (summarizing the trend
in England); Esmein, Liability in French Law for Damages Caused by Motor Vehicle
Accidents, 2 Am. J. Comp. L. 156 (1953); Malone, Damage Suits and the Contagious
Principle of Workmen's Compensation (pts. 1-2), 9 NACCA L.J. 20, 28-40, 10 NACCA
L.J. 45-49 (1952). For excerpts from relevant civil-law statutes and cases, see VON
MHREN, THE CIVIL LAW SvsT m 382-404, 436-44 (1957).
Some critics who generally oppose the loss distribution theory have conceded its im-
portance in the collision field, but oppose its implementation by the courts absent legis-
lative authorization. See Cooperrider, Comment on "The Law of Torts," 56 MICH. L.
REv. 1291, 1302 (1958).
6. E.g., Economnc-Financial Consequences of Personal Injuries Sustained il 1953
Philadelphia Auto Accidents, 7 TEMPLE UNIv. EcoN. & Bus. BULL. No. 3, at 25 (1955)
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from a complex of personal and environmental factors unrelated to individ-
ual moral fault ;7 and that collisions are largely attributable to society as a
whole -- the creator and beneficiary of automobiles and other dangerous in-
strumentalities 9 to which high accident rates are predictably incident.' 0 They
conclude that casualty losses should be distributed over the widest possible
segment of society through insurance companies and large self-insurers," or,
("There are wide differences of opinion on the cause of accidents, making determina-
tion of liability based on negligence difficult .... It is a rare case where there is clear
... negligence.").
Moreover, it is argued, the fault criterion for establishing liability has lost much of
its deterrent effect in collision situations. The accident may not flow from a state uf
mind which could effectively be deterred, see note 7 infra, and liability insurance has
insulated most drivers from any deterrent effect which civil liability might otherwise
retain. Also, other available deterrents are more powerful. Loss of driver's license, crim-
inal penalties, the immense inconvenience of accidents, and the drive for self-preserva-
tion are more effective than the vague threat of civil liability. James, Accident Liability
Reconsidered; The Impact of Liability Insurance, 57 YALE L.J. 549, 557-59 (1949):
Compensation for Accidents, 102 SOL. J. 729, 765 (1958).
7. "[T]he causes of vehicular accidents may reside in any of the factors constituting
the driving situation of a given instant, or in any momentary combination of such
factors. . . . [A] search for single causes of accidents is likely to prove unproduc-
tive . . . ." MCFARLAND, MOORE & WARREN, op. cit. supra note 2, at 14. "[I]ntensive
clinical examination of individuals suffering injuries led to the view that many accidents
are unconsciously motivated . . . . [Alceidents are but one expression of faulty adjust-
ments to the demands of life." Id. at 27-28. SCHULZINGER, THE AcCIDENT SYNDROME;
THE GENESIS op ACCIDENTAL INJURY, A CLINICAL APPROACH 11 (1956); James & Dick-
inson, Accident Proneness and Accident Law, 63 HARv. L. REv. 769, 794 (1950).
S. E.g., Hofstadter, Alternative Proposal to the Compensation Plan, 42 CORNELL
L.Q. 59, 61 (1956) ("[Flault lies not with man but with the automobile's tremendous
potential for mischief . . . [which is a] common burden to be dealt with on a collective,
not an individual, basis . ... ") ; Ehrenzweig, A Psychoanalysis of Negligence, 47 Nw.
U.L. REV. 855, 871 ('1953) ("inevitable incidents of our hazardous society") ; authorities
cited note 15 infra. Professor Ehrenzveig further suggests that imposition of liability on
fault grounds is essentially punitive and retributive, not preventive, and manifests a so-
cietal feeling of guilt over high accident rates. 47 Nw. U.L. REv. at 872.
9. Early attempts to classify the automobile as a dangerous instrumentality necv.c-
sitating absolute liability were, however, repulsed. Annot., Dangerous Instrunentality
Doctrine as Applied to Automobiles, 16 A.L.R. 270 (1922).
10. On the predictability of automobile accidents, see, e.g., N.Y. Times, Sept. 3, 1958,
p. 35, col. 6 ("Traffic accidents during the three-day Labor Day week-end took 420 lives,
exactly the number predicted by the National Safety Council.").
11. Extension of insurance as a means of effectuating loss distribution has been
widely advocated and widely provided by statute. For a review of the literature and
statutes, see INSTITUTE OF JUDICIAL ADmINISTRATION, COM.PULSORY AUTOMOBILE INSUR-
ANCE (1956). Only two states have adopted universal compulsory automobile insurance
statutes. MASS. ANN. LAws ch. 90, §§ 34a-34j (1954, Supp. 1958); N.Y. VEHICLF &
TRAFFIC LAW §§ 93-93k. Hit-and-run and out-of-state drivers may produce uninsured
accidents even in these states. Note, 32 N.Y.U.L. REv. 147 (1957). Insurance has been
compulsory for all motorists in England since 1930. Compensation for Accidents, 102
SOL. J. 729, 730 (1958). Other Commonwealth jurisdictions have followed the English
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preferably, through a comprehensive social insurance program.' 2 The pro-
ponents of loss distribution would deny contribution among tortfeasors be-
cause almost invariably an injured party will pursue the most solvent of his
tortfeasors, that is, the one who usually can best distribute the loss.' 3 They
contend, therefore, that contribution will most frequently operate to defeat
loss distribution by allowing superior loss distributors-notably insurance
companies-to elicit damages from individuals who cannot shift losses.14
The third pertinent consideration is the desirability of securing rapid and
adequate compensation for accident victims.'5 Commentators who emphasize
this objective (usually those who endorse loss distribution)' 6 point out that
example. Castles, Compulsory Automobile Liability Insurance it Australasia, 6 Am. J.
Comsp. L. 257 (1957).
For criticism of compulsory insurance, see Lemmon, Compulsory Insurance-A Toxic
Brew, 1956 INs. L.J. 695 (1956).
12. See, e.g., 2 HAIPE & JAaI~s, TORTS § 13 (1956).
13. James, Contribution Among Joint Tortfeasors: A Pragmatic Criticism, 54 HARV.
L. Rxv. 1156, 1167 (1941).
14. Ibid.; Jones, Contribution Anwng Tortfeasors, 11 U. FLA. L. REv. 175 (1958).
15. The relatively few studies which have been made of the problem of victim
compensation include: COLUMBIA UNIvFsrrey COUNCIL FOR RESEARCH IN THE SOCIAL
SCIENCES, REPORT BY THE COMMITTEE TO STUDY COMPENSATION FOR AUTOMOBILE Acci-
DENTS (1932) (28% of defendants uninsured; plaintiffs recovered enough to meet ex-
penses from 15% of uninsured defendants and from 64% of insured defendants) ; Eco-
nomic-Financial Consequences of Personal lnjuries Sutstahwd io 1953 Philadelphia Auto
Accidents, 7 TEMPLE UNIv. EcoN. & Bus. BULL. No. 3, at 42 (1955) (only 64% of
vehicular accident victims obtained recovery from any source) ; James & Law, Compen-
sation for Auto Accident Victims: A Story of Too Little and Too Late, 26 CONN. B.J.
70 (1952) (34% of defendants uninsured; plaintiffs recovered enough to meet expenses
from 22% of uninsured defendants and from 80% of insured defendants); ILL. LEGIs-
LATIVE COUNCIL, PUB. 128, MOTOR VEHICLE ACCIDENT COMPENSATION 1 (1956). Com-
pare the insurance industry publication, The National Underwriter, Dec. 21, 1957, p. 33,
coL 1 (recent report found that "the people of Michigan have no problem of protection
against financial loss caused by an uninsured motorist" and only 4.5% of all cars in the
state are uninsured).
16. See authorities collected note 5 supra.
For many years, proponents of victim compensation and loss distribution have ad-
vocated both the total abandonment of the fault principle in collision situations and the
adoption of compensation schemes analogous to workmen's compensation. See, e.g., Rol-
lins, A Proposal To Extend the Compensation Principle to Accidents in the Street, 4
MASS. L.Q. 392 (1919) ; Carman, Is a Motor Vehicle Accident Compensation Act Ad-
visable?, 4 MfiNN. L. REv. 1 (1919) ; COLUMBIA UNla-vI COUNCIL FOR RESEARCH IN
THE SOCIAL SCIENCES, op. cit. supra note 15; Grad, Recent Developments ht Automobile
Accident Compensation, 50 COLUm. L. REv. 300 (1950) ; Marx, "Motorisnln, Not "Pedes-
trianism ": Compensation for the Automobile's Victims, 42 A.B.A.J. 421 (1956). But see
Ryan & Green, Pedestrianism: A Strange Philosophy, 42 A.B.A.J. 117 (1956). Only
the rural Canadian province of Saskatchewan has adopted a motor-vehicle-accident com-
pensation statute. Green, Automobile Accident Insurance Legislation in the Prozince of
Saskatchewan, 31 J. Co.ir. LEG. & INT'L L. (3d ser.) 39 (1949). Even the insurance
industry, suffering financially from unlimited jury verdicts, is now taking a less hostile
attitude toward fixed-recovery compensation schemes. Dykes, Report of the Automobile
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the prolonged nature of delictual inquiry and the congestion of court dockets
inhibit compensation. 1  They oppose contribution among tortfeasors because
it enlarges the number of parties who must be considered in settlement nego-
tiations and reduces the likelihood that a plaintiff's claim will be disposed of
without recourse to costly and time-consuming litigation.18 In addition, if
suits between tortfeasors are consolidated with the trial of the injured party's
claim, the proceedings may be obfuscated and prolonged.' Furthermore, al-
though the plaintiff may enforce his entire judgment against any tortfeasors
found liable 2 0 a jury may reduce the size of a judgment if an impleaded
tortfeasor appears unable to pass on his losses.21
Insurance Committee-1958, 25 INS. COUNSEL J. 261, 265-66 (1958). For a survey of
foreign law, see Deak, Liability and Compensation for Automobile Accidents-A Survey
of Foreign Legislation, 21 MINN. L. Ev. 123 (1937) ; Comment, Motor Vehicle Acci-
dent Compensation; Types and Trends, 2 Am. J. Coup. L. 515 (1953).
17. It has been estimated that automobile-accident personal-injury cases account for
70-90% of the civil jury trial congestion. ATTORNEY GENERAL'S CONFERENCE ON COURT
CONGESTION AND DELAY Ix LITIGATION, PROCEEDINGS 13 (1956) (remarks of Sheldon
D. Elliott, Director of the Institute of Judicial Administration). Moreover, trial delay
has become a weapon in the hands of defendants and a stalking horse for settlement
negotiations. SHUTLMAN & JAMEs, CASES ON TORTS 637-53 (2d ed. 1952) (collecting
materials) ; ATrORNEY GENERAI's CONFERENCE, op. cit. supra at 3 (remarks of U.S. At-
torney General Brownell) ("Legitimate claims have been settled at a fraction of their
worth because there was not available timely judicial relief.").
Some commentators take the position that an increase in the number of judges and
procedural streamlining will solve the congestion problem; others, that the only effective
remedy is to abolish the common law of negligence in automobile cases.
Delay in federal district courts is as much as forty-two months in metropolitan dis-
tricts, Warren, Delay and Congestion in the Federal Courts, 42 J. Au. JUD. Soc'y 6, 7-9
(1958), and up to forty months in some state courts of primary jurisdiction, INSTITUTE
OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION, CALENDAR STATUS STUDY i (1956).
18. James, Contribution Among Joint Tortfeasors: A Pragmatic Criticism, 54 HARV.
L. Rsv. 1156, 1160-65 (1941) ; UNIlFORm CONTRIBUTION AMONG ToRTEAsoRs AcT, Com-
missioners' Note to § 4(b), 9 U.L.A. 25 (Supp. 1958). The settlement problem is
aggravated because the release of one tortfeasor by the injured party does not act to
release a joint tortfeasor from liability for contribution. This defect is remedied in the
latest proposal of the Commissioners. Ibid. See also Jones, supra note 14, at 216-17.
19. James, Contribution Among Joint Tortfeasors: A Pragmatic Criticism, 54 HARD.
L. REv. 1156, 1160 (1941) ; Jones, supra note 14, at 217.
Even proponents of contribution have acknowledged this deficiency. E.g., Gregory, Tort
Contribution Practice in New York, 20 CORNELL L.Q. 269, 272 (1935) ("terrible incon-
venience" to plaintiff).
The New York procedural statute specifically admonishes the court not to allow a
controversy between defendants when it will "delay a judgment in the main controversy."
N.Y. Civ. PRAc. AcT § 264. Compare Hills v. Price, 79 F. Supp. 494, 496 (E.D.S.C.
1948) (impleader denied because it "would force the plaintiff into uncontemplated and
perhaps undesired litigation").
20. 1 HARPER & JAMES, TORTS § 10.1, at 705 (1956) ; PRossm, TORTS 240 (2d ed.
1955); 4 RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 879 (1939).
21. A recent case provides unique insight into this problem. When informed that a
municipality held liable to a pedestrian would recover the entire judgment from an in-
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American jurisdictions2 2 have variously responded to the desiderata of
moral fault, loss distribution, and victim compensation. By retaining the
common-law rule against contribution, twenty-four states implement only loss
distribution and victim compensation. 23 In disregard of loss distribution and
victim compensation, nineteen jurisdictions allow contribution. Fourteen of
these jurisdictions permit one joint tortfeasor to compel pro rata contributions
from all joint tortfeasors.2 4 Giving this fault-oriented approach full expression,
the five others attempt to divide damages strictly according to each tortfeasor's
degree of fault.2 r The eight remaining states--striving unsuccessfully to har-
dividual property owner on a theory of indemnity (see appendix II D infra), the jury
reduced its award to the injured part3 from $13,000 to $7,000. Helz v. Pittsburgh, 387
Pa. 169, 172, 127 A.2d 89, 91 (1956). On the attitude of juries toward impecunious
parties generally, see Kalvern, The Jury, The Law, and The Personal Injutry Damage
Award, 19 OHio ST. L.J. 158 (1958).
22. In foreign and admiralty jurisdictions, where adequate insurance is compulsory
and loss distribution and victim compensation are therefore assured, contribution has been
made generally available. In England, the rule against contribution was abolished by
statute in 1935; most of the Commonwealth jurisdictions have done likewise. WILLIAMS,
JOINT ToRTS AND CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE § 29 (1951) (collecting statutes). Under
the English statute, contribution may be ordered by the court in collision cases as "equity"
demands whenever two tortfeasors share a common liability to the plaintiff. Id. §§ 25-
54. In France, a tortfeasor in a collision case may seek contribution for a "just share"
if the injured party joins both tortfeasors in his action. But if the injured party chooses
to sue only one, contribution may not be enforced unless the tortfeasor seeking contribu-
tion is able to meet the relatively onerous standards of proof of another section of the
Civil Code, § 1382. 2 MAZEAUD, MAZEAUD & TUNc, op. cit. supra note 3, § 1661. For a
survey of foreign jurisdictions, see Cohn, Responsibility of Joint Wrongdoers in Con-
tiwntal Law, 51 L.Q. REv. 468 (1935).
In collisions at sea, contribution in equal shares has long been allowed. GILMoRE &
BLAcx, ADMIRALTY 402 (1957). All maritime nations other than the United States have
adhered to the Brussels Collision Liability Convention of 1910, which provides for ap-
portionment of damages in accordance with the degree of fault. Id. at 439.
23. Appendix I D infra.
24. Appendix I B infra.
The statutes of Maryland, New Mexico, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, and South
Dakota are based upon the UNIFORM CoxTmuRuTIOx AMONG ToRTYEASORs AcT (1939),
9 U.L.A. 230, 233 (1957). The act was withdrawn by the Commissioners in 1955 because
of lack of "uniformity" and "unfavorable reports as to the progress and the operation
of the Act." 9 U.L.A. 19 (Supp. 1958). The 1955 revised Uniform Act has been adopted
only in North Dakota. Ibid.
25. Appendix I A infra.
The statutes of Arkansas, Delaware, Hawaii, and South Dakota are based upon the
1939 Uniform Act, which contained an optional provision allowing apportionment rather
than contribution in equal shares "when there is such a disproportion of fault among
joilit tortfeasors as to render inequitable an equal distribution among them." UNIFORM
C, z'RmnUTION AMONG TOR'rEAsORs AcT § 2(4) (1939), 9 U.L.A. 230, 235 (1957). The
1955 Uniform Act omits this provision and states that "relative degrees of fault shall
not be considered." This retreat from the fault principle is justified on the ground that
consideration of degrees of negligence is impractical. 9 U.L.A. 22-23 ('Supp. 1958). The
Wisconsin statute, Wis. STAT. § 331.045 (1955), which allows apportionment between
1959]
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monize all policy considerations-have enacted statutes which authorize con-
tribution only when the injured party joins two or more cotortfeasors in his
original action.20 Because plaintiff will normally seek recovery from only the
most solvent tortfeasor in order to avoid the delays and complexities which
a multiparty proceeding might produce, the fault principle usually is not acti-
vated under these statutes except when a plaintiff is uncertain about the lia-
bility or solvency of several prospective defendants.2 7
As state positions on contribution have tended to solidify, the battle over
controlling policy has shifted to a new arena. In contribution and non-con-
tribution states, attempts have recently been made to apply an indemnity doc-
trine in collision situations.2 8 As developed by the courts, indemnity operates
more harshly than contribution and allows one tortfeasor to shift all damages
to a more culpable joint wrongdoer.29 The courts have employed different
verbal formulas to express the disparity in quality or degree of fault neces-
sary to establish a cause of action for indemnity. Most commonly, they require
"active" negligence by indemnitor and "passive" negligence by indemnitee.30
plaintiff and defendant in accordance with relative degrees of fault, has been construed
not to apply in an action for contribution between defendants. Brown v. Haertel, 210
Wis. 354, 246 N.W. 691 (1933); Note, 26 MARQ. L. REV. 151 (1942).
26. Appendix I C infra.
Federal and state rules permitting procedural impleader do not allow a defendant to
implead a joint tortfeasor for contribution under these statutes. E.g., D'Onofrio Constr.
Co. v. Recon. Co., 255 F.2d 904 (1st Cir. 1958); Fox v. Western N.Y. Motor Lines,
Inc., 257 N.Y. 305, 178 N.E. 289 (1931).
27. Advocates of contribution criticize the "joint judgment" defendant statutes be-
cause they make "contribution available only at the whim of the injured plaintiff."
Gregory, Tort Contribution Practice in New York, 20 CORNELL L.Q. 269 (1935):
Stevens, supra note 4, at 52.
28. Appendix III infra.
The availability of contribution does not extinguish the right to full indemnity. UNI-
FORm CoNTRahTioN AmONG TOTwEAsoRs ACr § 1(f), 9 U.L.A. 15 (Supp. 1958) (col-
lecting statutes). E.g., Thomas v. Malco Refineries, Inc., 214 F.2d 884 (10th Cir. 1954).
29. Appendix II infra.
Although indemnity was not derived from the English common law, it is presently
available in England. WILLIASfS, op. cit. supra note 22, § 45. "Full recourse" against a
joint tortfeasor is also permitted under the French Civil Code. 1 SAVATIER, TRAITL Dx
LA RESPOxSABILITL CIVILE § 403 (2d ed. 1951). But in both England and France, in-
demnity is limited to cases in which the indemnitee was only vicariously liable.
For general discussions of indemnity, see Note, 45 HARv. L. Rav. 349 (1931); Leflar,
Contribution and Indemnity Between Tortfeasors, 81 U. PA. L. REv. 130 (1932) ; Bohlen,
Contribution and Indemnity Between Tortfeasors, 22 CORNELL L.Q. 469 (1937); Davis,
Indemnity Between Negligent Tortfeasors: A Proposed Rationale, 37 IOWA L. REv. 517
(1952).
30. Davis, supra note 29, at 529-44. The issue of "active"-"passive" negligence may
be a fact question submitted to the jury along with the issues of negligence and contribu-
tory negligence. E.g., McFall v. Compagnie Maritime Beige, 304 N.Y. 314, 328-29, 107
N.E.2d 463, 471 (1952) ; Banks v. Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp., 224 F.2d 631, 634-
35 (2d Cir. 1955); Lebeck v. William A. Jarvis, Inc., 145 F. Supp. 706, 710 (E.D. Pa.
1956).
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So far, however, few would-be indemnitees have met with success in collision
cases. 8' At least seventeen states have rejected the doctrine's applicability,
and only one has accepted it.32 Nevertheless, indemnity is urged with increas-
ing frequency by collision defendants, and its applicability will doubtless soon
be litigated in many of the remaining jurisdictions.2 3
The recent case of Shapiro v. Gulf, Mobile & Ohio Railroad exemplifies
the difficulties of applying indemnity in a vehicular collision case.34 Two
automobile passengers were seriously injured and another killed when an on-
coming train struck the automobile at an Illinois grade crossing.3 5 The two
injured passengers and decedent's administrator brought suit in federal dis-
trict court against both the driver of the automobile and the railroad.30 Fol-
lowing the terms of Illinois' automobile guest statute, the plaintiffs charged
the driver with "wilful and wanton" misconduct in his operation of the auto-
mobile.8 7 The allegations against the railroad included failure properly to
maintain and equip the crossing and the train, and the negligent or reckless
operation of the train by its agents.3 8 The railroad denied these charges and
filed a cross-claim against the driver. The cross-claim alleged that, if the rail-
road had acted negligently toward the plaintiffs, its negligence was only
31. "Collision cases" is used to include all collisions between two vehicles one or
both of which are in motion.
32. Appendix III infra.
33. Of the jurisdictions cited in appendix III infra, the issue has arisen in three
during the past year and in five during the past two years.
34. 256 F.2d 193 (7th Cir. 1958). State ex rel. Seigel v. McLaughlin, 315 S.W.2d
499 (Mo. Ct. App. 1958), presents virtually identical issues.
35. 256 F.2d at 194.
36. Ibid.
The two surviving passengers each sought a judgment of $100,000 for personal in-
juries. The administrator sought $25,000 for wrongful death, as limited by ILL. REV.
STrAT. ch. 70, § 2 (1957).
37. 256 F.2d at 195.
No person riding in ... a motor vehicle ... as a guest without 1payment for such
ride... shall have a cause of action for damages against the driver . . . of such
motor vehicle . . . or its owner . . . for injury, death or loss, in case of accident,
unless such accident shall have been caused by the wilful and wanton misconduct
of the driver . . . of such motor vehicle . . . or its owner . . . and unless such
wilful and wanton misconduct contributed to the injury, death or loss for which
the action is brought.
ILl.. REv. STAT. ch. 95Y2, § 9-201 (1957).
Since the driver and the passengers were apparently members of the same family, it
ih unlikely that recovery would have been sought from the driver unless he had been
insured. But Illinois law precludes disclosure of the facts of insurance coverage. Com-
ment, 43 ILL. L. REv. 650 (1948) ; 15 U. CHI. L. REV. 986 (1948).
38. 256 F.2d at 196.
The violation of several statutory duties may also have been charged. See ILL. REv.
STAT. ch. 114, §§ 58, 59, 62-63, 80, 82, 187-88 (1957).
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"passive," and that, in contrast, the driver was guilty of either "active" neg-
ligence or willful and wanton misconduct.3 9
After plaintiffs' complaint against the driver had been dismissed for want
of diversity jurisdiction, he moved to dismiss the railroad's cross-claim for
failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. He contended
that contribution would violate the common-law rule in Illinois and that in-
demnity was not available in collision cases. The driver further argued that,
even if indemnity were generally permitted, its application in this case on
the basis of an "active"-"passive" negligence dichotomy would permit re-
covery against a host for less than the willful and wanton misconduct pre-
scribed by the Illinois guest statute.40 The trial court dismissed the cross-
claim without taking affidavits or testimony and entered final judgment for
the driver.41 The railroad then appealed to the Seventh Circuit, while the
passengers' complaint against the railroad remained in the district court pend-
ing the outcome.42
Having examined the allegations contained in both the plaintiffs' original
complaint and the cross-claim, the Seventh Circuit upheld the dismissal of
the latter.43 The court reasoned that the allegations in the original complaint,
charging the railroad with conduct which constituted "active" negligence, ren-
dered irrelevant the assertion in the cross-claim that the railroad's negligence,
if any, was "passive." The court then found that the "active" negligence
established by the complaint barred an action for indemnity, because Illinois
permits indemnity only when the disparate negligence of two joint tortfeasors
falls within the "active"-"passive" formula. Petitioning for a rehearing, the
railroad argued that even "active" negligence is not a bar to indemnity from
a codefendant who, as in the principal case, was guilty of willful and wanton
misconduct. This contention was summarily rejected on the ground that Illi-
39. Brief for Appellants, p. 14a.
The cross-claim is summarized at 256 F.2d 195. The second count of the cross-claim,
alleging damage to the railroad's equipment in the amount of $1,000, was dismissed for
insufficiency of jurisdictional amount and is not discussed in this Note.
40. The foregoing contentions appear in detail in the Brief for Appellee.
41. The district court's memorandum opinion, dated September 11, 1958, is unreported
but appears in the Brief for Appellants, p. 16a. The district court made an express find-
ing under Federal Rule 54(b) and executed a certificate of finality, both of which are
necessary to allow separate appeal. 6 MooRE, FEDERAL PRACrcE ir 54.35 (2d ed. 194);
Pabellon v. Grace Line, Inc., 191 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1951).
42. For a preferred procedure in this situation, see note 63 infra.
43. "[W]e must look to the allegations of the cross-claim, together with the allega-
tions of the complaint to which it is addressed." 256 F.2d at 196. (Emphasis by the
court.) No authority was cited for this proposition. The only reason given for looking
to the allegations of both claims was the fact that the district court had dismissed the
cross-claim. In dismissing the cross-claim, the district court had also relied upon the
allegations of the original complaint, but failed to cite any authority for this view of
the pleadings. Brief for Appellant, p. 19a.
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nois law does not directly "support" the indemnification of an actively neg-
ligent party by a willful and wanton joint tortfeasor. 4
Irrespective of whether indemnity was properly allowable in Shapiro, the
Seventh Circuit erred procedurally (as have other courts deciding similar
cases) 4 5 when it dismissed the railroad's cross-claim on the basis of facts
alleged in the plaintiffs' original complaint. For purposes of ruling on the
motion to dismiss, the court should have looked solely to the allegations in
the cross-claim to determine whether the railroad could be found "passively"
rather than "actively" negligent.46 The same rules for testing the sufficiency
of a complaint govern the sufficiency of a cross-claim.47 And, just as a com-
plaint's allegations are accepted as true without reference to the charges mani-
fested by other claims pending in the same action,48 a cross-claim's allegations
should be accepted as true without reference to the contents of the com-
plaint.49 By treating complaints and cross-claims inconsistently, the Shapiro
decision effectively discourages a cross-claimant from consolidating the trial
44. The foregoing history of the case and the opinion on rehearing appear in 256
F.2d at 196.
On rehearing, the court stated: "we do not find any authority in Illinois giving direct
support to . . . [indemnity of an 'actively' negligent tortfeasor by one guilty of willful
and wanton misconduct]. In the absence of such a declaration by the Illinois courts we
shall not attempt to so hold in this case." Ibid. These two sentences constitute the court's
disposition of the railroad's argument concerning the driver's alleged willful and wanton
misconduct. If the court had been consistent in its view of the pleadings, it could well
have disposed of this second contention on the same ground as it did the first. By look-
ing to the allegations of the original complaint, it would have found that the railroad
was charged with "recklessness"-a charge which surely would preclude recovery by the
railroad even if the driver had been willful and wanton.
45. E.g., Peak Drilling Co. v. Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Co., 215 F.2d 368,
370 (10th Cir. 1954); State ex rel. Seigel v. McLaughlin, 315 S.W.2d 499, 502, 507
(AMo. Ct. App. 1958); Messaro v. Long Island R.R., 274 App. Div. 939, 83 N.Y.S.2d
527 (1948).
46. The Seventh Circuit seems to have disregarded its own contrary precedent. Blair
v. Cleveland Twist Drill Co., 197 F.2d 842 (7th Cir. 1952). In that indemnity case, also
arising under Illinois law, the court overruled a motion to dismiss a cross-claim despite
allegations in the complaint charging the cross-claimant with "negligent operation and
control" of a machine tool system and failure to provide workmen with adequate pro-
tective garb. Such conduct could readily have been labeled "active" negligence.
47. E.g., Hopkins v. Guth, 14 F.R.D. 193, 194 (E.D. Pa. 1953).
48. 2 Moox, FEDERAL PRAcriCE f 12.08 (2d ed. 1948) (collecting cases). Allegations
of a claim must be viewed in the light most favorable to the claimant, and all facts well
pleaded must be admitted and accepted as true. A complaint should not be dismissed un-
less it appears to a certainty that plaintiff is entitled to-no relief under any state of
fact which could be proved in support of the claim. Ibid.
49. See, e.g., Atella v. General Elec. Co., 21 F.R.D. 372, 374 (D.R.I. 1957) ("for
the purposes of a motion to dismiss, a [third-party] complaint should be viewed in the
light most favorable to the [third-party] plaintiff") ; Roth v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co.,
12 F.R.D. 383, 386 (E.D.N.Y. 1952) ("well-pleaded material allegations of the third
party complaint must be taken as admitted") ; Hayes v. Wilmington, 243 NC. 525, 538,
91 S.E.2d 673, 683 (1956).
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of his indemnity suit with that of the original tort action.50 For the plaintiff
will ordinarily plead in the light most unfavorable to the defendant, and treat-
ing the facts so pleaded as true will nearly always result in the conclusion
that the defendant could not, on any construction of the facts, be deemed
"passively" negligent. Moreover, by giving conclusive effect to the allegations
in the complaint, the Seventh Circuit achieved the anomalous result of grant-
ing mere allegations a more binding effect than an adverse judgment would
be accorded. A previous judgment for the plaintiffs would not of itself have
barred the railroad from suing the driver for indemnity in a separate action,51
but the dismissal of the cross-claim, though based only on plaintiff's charges,
operates as res judicata to bar such a suit.52
Had proper procedure been followed and the cross-claim's allegations been
accepted as true, the court probably would have concluded that the railroad was,
on at least one construction of the facts, "passively" negligent. The Seventh
Circuit would then have had to face the driver's contention that indemnity is
not available in collision cases. Since that issue has never arisen in Illinois,53
the court would most likely have looked to those states where it has-the
50. Consolidated trial is designed to facilitate rapid and efficient adjudication of
claims. See United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 340 U.S. 543, 556 (1951). Although con-
solidated trials may often lead to more efficient administration of justice and should not
therefore be precluded in any class of actions, they may prejudice the rights of one of
the parties under some circumstances. See note 21 supra and accompanying text. In that
event, the court may order separate trial under FmD. R. Crv. P. 42(a).
51. E.g., George A. Fuller Co. v. Otis Elevator Co., 245 U.S. 489 (1918); Craw-
ford v. Pope & Talbot, Inc., 206 F.2d 784, 794 (3d Cir. 1953) ; Oceanic Steam Nay. Co.
v. Compania Transatlantica Espanola, 134 N.Y. 461, 469, 31 N.E. 987, 989 (1892); RE-
STATEMENT, JUDaGMENTS §§ 106-07 (1942). On the other hand, when both would-be in-
demnitee and another joint torffeasor are party to the original action, and the former
is found negligent while the latter is not held liable, indemnity in a separate action is
often barred. E.g., Fidelity & Cas. Co. v. Federal Express, Inc., 136 F.2d 35 (6th Cir.
1943).
Settlement with the original plaintiff also does not preclude the would-be indemnitee
from seeking indemnity in a subsequent action against a joint tortfeasor. E.g., Damanti
v. A/S Inger, 153 F. Supp. 600, 601. (E.D.N.Y. 1957).
52. Dismissal of a rule 13(g) cross-claim operates as an adjudication on the merits,
barring subsequent suit. See, 3 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE f1 13.34 (2d ed. 1948).
53. The closest precedent in Illinois was Gulf, M. & O.R.R. v. Arthur Dixon Trans-
fer Co., 343 Ill. App. 148, 98 N.E.2d 783 (1951), which was heavily relied upon by the
railroad in the principal case. There, however, the indemnitee-railroad had been held
liable to the original plaintiff under the Federal Employers Liability Act. The case thus
falls within a familiar category of cases in which indemnity has traditionally been al-
lowed. Appendix II B infra. Other cases cited by the railroad also involved traditional
indemnity situations. In Palmer House Co. v. Otto, 347 Il. App. 198, 106 N.E.2d 753
(1952), the indemnitee, a controller of premises, was held liable to a third party. See
appendix II A infra. Blair v. Cleveland Twist Drill Co., 197 F.2d 842 (7th Cir. 1952),
another FELA case, involved a chattel user who was allowed an action for indemniti,
against the supplier. See appendix II F infra. For a general discussion of the Illinois
indemnity cases prior to Shapiro, see Comment, 19 U. Cmx. L. Ray. 388 (1952) ; Note,
32 CHI.-KENT L REv. 298 (1954).
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overwhelming majority of which have refused to allow indemnity in collision
cases." The usual theory for disallowing indemnity is that, because no legal
relationship existed between the two tortfeasors prior to the commission of
the tort, they both owed the same duty to the injured party.55 A legal rela-
tionship like that of contractor-subcontractor, landlord-tenant, or master-ser-
vant provides a convenient doctrinal basis for implying an agreement that
one tortfeasor (subcontractor, tenant, servant) will perform the duties im-
plicit in the relationship without injuring third parties and, should injury
occur, will indemnify the other tortfeasor (contractor, landlord, master).5 6
54. See appendix III infra.
55. The leading case setting forth the requirement of a prior legal relationship is
Builders Supply Co. v. McCabe, 366 Pa. 322, 328, 77 A.2d 368, 371 (1951):
In the case of concurrent or joint tortfeasors, having no legal relationship to one
another, each of them owing the same duty to the injured party, and involved in
an accident in which the injury occurs, there is complete unanimity among the
authorities everywhere that no right of indemnity exists on behalf of either against
the other.
Accord, Helz v. Pittsburgh, 387 Pa. 169, 175, 127 A.2d 89, 91 (1956); Panichella v.
Pennsylvania R.R., 150 F, Supp. 79 (W.D. Pa. 1957), reVd on other grounds, 252 F.2d
452 (3d Cir. 1958).
Many jurisdictions have followed the Pennsylvania Builders Supply rule in collision
and other indemnity cases. E.g., United States v. Acord, 209 F.2d 709, 7,15 (10th Cir.
1954), cert. denicd, 347 U.S. 975 (,1954) (applying N.M. law); Roth v. Greyhound
Corp., 149 F. Supp. 454, 456 (E.D. Pa. 1957) (Ind. law); Bolton v. Ziegler, 111 F.
Supp. 516, 522 (N.D. Iowa 1953) (Iowa law); State ex rel. Seigel v. McLaughlin,
315 S.W.2d 499, 507 (Mo. Ct. App. 1958). Sometimes the prior legal relationship is said
to be but one important factor. E.g., United States v. Savage Truck Line, 209 F.2d 442
(4th Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 952 (1954) (Va. law).
In Texas the prior legal relationship need be only a "duty" running from indemnitor
to indemnitee. This tautologous rule was first proposed in Hodges, Contribution and
Indemnity Among Tortfeasors, 26 TEXAs L. REv. 150, 162 (1947), and later employed
in Humble Oil & Ref. Co. v. Martin, 148 Tex. 175, 222 S.W2d 995 (1949), and Brown
& Root, Inc. v. United States, 198 F.2d 138 (5th Cir. 1952) (operator of truck colliding
with contractor's barricade owed no duty to contractor to indemnify him against settle-
ment with third parties injured in the collision). The "duty" requirement may be deemed
easily met. Ft. Worth & D. Ry. v. Threadgill, 228 F.2d 307, 312 (5th Cir. 1955) (dic-
tum) (railroad, whose motor car on grade crossing was struck by automobile, owed
duty to all drivers on the highway).
56. See appendix II infra.
The rationale of the implied agreement to indemnify was carried furthest in Ryan
Stevedoring Co. v. Pan-Atlantic S.S. Corp., 350 U.S. 124, 133-34 (1956), Note, 66 YALE
L.J. 581, 584 (1957). There, a shipowner held to respond in damages to an employee
was allowed indemnity against his stevedoring 60ntractor. The Court implied a contrac-
tual "warranty of workmanlike service that is comparable to a manufacturer's warranty
of the soundness of its manufactured product." 350 U.S. at 133. In adopting this con-
tractual approach to the distribution of liability, the court specifically refuted the neces-
sity of relying on the "active"-"passve" negligence test used by the lower court. Id. at
134. See Palazzolo v. Pan-Atlantic S.S. Corp., 211 F.2d 277, 279 (1954). The Ryan
"warranty of workmanlike service" has been followed in subsequent maritime cases.
E.g., Crumady v. The Joachim Hendrik Fisser, 79 Sup. Ct. 445 (1959); Weyerhaeuser
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Although it serves as a facile rationale for awarding indemnity, a prior
legal relationship is only incidental to the true function of such an award. 7
That special relationships occasion indemnity is explained by the fact that
they usually involve operators of enterprises and controllers of property who
increasingly are held strictly liable in tort.58 Strict liability, while often assur-
ing loss distribution and victim compensation, tends to minimize if not entire-
ly disregard the principle of moral fault. Indemnity reintroduces that principle
and permits a comparatively blameless defendant-sued because he had the
deepest pocket or offered the best target for a speedy recoupment of damages
-to shift the loss to a primarily culpable joint tortfeasor.59 The key to in-
demnity cases has not been the existence of a legal relationship but the goal
of making the principal wrongdoer pay for his negligence.60 Hence, the desir-
S.S. Co. v. Nacirema Operating Co., 355 U.S. 563 (1958); American President Lines,
Ltd. v. Marine Terminals Corp., 234 F.2d 753 (9th Cir. 1956). The tendency to imply
a contractual indemnity is also reflected in the recent case in which the House of Lords
implied a clause in an employee's contract to indemnify his employer against injury to
third parties. Lister v. Romford Ice & Cold Storage Co., [1957] A.C. 555; appendix II
C infra.
57. The New York Court of Appeals and the Second Circuit have not relied upon
the existence of a prior legal relationship and have adopted what is essentially a rule
of comparative negligence for joint tortfeasors. McFall v. Compagnie Maritime Beige,
304 N.Y. 314, 328, 107 N.E.2d 463, 472 (1952) (absence of prior contractual relation-
ship irrelevant); Banks v. Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp., 224 F.2d 631, 635 (2d
Cir. 1955) ("active"-"passive" test essentially a question of "comparative negligence of
the two actors to be decided by the jury") ; Slattery v. Marra Bros., 186 F.2d 134, 139
(2d Cir. 1951) (dictum) ("regardless of any other relation between them, the difference
in gravity of their faults may be great enough to throw the whole loss upon one...") :
see Orlove v. Philippine Air Lines, Inc., 257 F.2d 384 (2d Cir. 1958), cert. denicd, 35S
U.S. 909 (1958). See generally Meriarn & Thornton, Indemnity Between Tort!easors:
An Evolving Doctrine in the New York Court of Appeals, 25 N.Y.U.L. REv. 845 (1950).
An early Supreme Court decision, Union Stockyards Co. v. Chicago, B. & Q.R.R..
196 U.S. 217, 228 (1905), which denied indemnity without considering the presence or
absence of a prior legal relationship, is still frequently relied upon. E.g., Lowe v. New
York Cent. R.R., 148 F. Supp. 337, 339 (E.D. Mich. .1957).
The existence of a prior legal relationship may be wholly fortuitous. For examplc.
if the vehicle colliding with the train in Shapiro had been the truck of an express com-
pany under contract with the railroad that contract would presumably have given risc
to an action for indemnity under the Pennsylvania rule. Cf. Gulf, M. & O.R.R. v. Arthur
Dixon Transfer Co., 343 Ill. App. 148, 98 N.E.2d 783 (1951).
58. See, e.g., Gregory, Trespass to Negligence to Absolute Liability, 37 VA. L. RLv.
359 (1951) ; Leflar, Negligence in Name Only, 27 N.Y.U.L. REv. 564 (1952) ; Ognall.
Some Facets of Strict Liability in. the United States and Their Implications, 33 NoTm
DAME LAw. 239 (1958).
59. The situations in which indemnity has been most frequently allowed are set forth
in appendix II infra. The salient feature in most of these situations is that the indenmitee
was held liable to the original plaintiff under some doctrine or statute imposing strict
liability.
60. [As liability regardless of personal fault] extends itself there will tend to be an
equivalent extension of rights to indemnity, arising from an attempt to allocate
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ability of allowing indemnity in collision cases should turn not upon the ab-
sence of a prior legal relationship, as it has in most court decisions, but, first,
upon the desirability of emphasizing moral fault as against victim compen-
sation and loss distribution, and, second, upon the extent to which indemnity
achieves that emphasis.
The Shapiro court could have found a basis in Illinois policy for refusing
to allow indemnity in collision cases. Because Illinois law rejects contribu-
tion,01 it in effect prefers loss distribution and victim compensation over
measuring damages by moral fault. Viewed in terms of loss distribution, in-
demnity raises with even greater force the arguments which would deny con-
tribution in collision cases, 2 for indemnity enables a superior loss distributor
to shift not just a contributory share but all damages to a tortfeasor who
cannot pass on his losses. As regards the compensation of accident victims,
indemnity again suffers from the defects ascribed to contribution: complex
trials or settlement negotiations, and the danger that a jury will not return
an optimum judgment.0 3 Hence, Illinois policy would seem to reject the use
of indemnity in collision cases.
In fact, indemnity-resting as it does on the "active"-"passive" distinction
-is inapposite as a collision-case doctrine even in states which emphasize
moral fault by allowing contribution. Relative degrees of fault are particularly
difficult to ascertain in a collision, and provide unreliable criteria for attach-
ing all-or-nothing liability.64 As applied by a court or jury, the "active"-
ultimate loss according to more orthodox principles of tort law, principles which
will still be alive and active despite the attempt to distribute immediate losses
quickly on some more socialized theory.
Leflar, Contribution- and Indemnity Between Tortfeasors, 81, U. PA. L. REV. 130, 150
(1932).
61. See Comment, 19 U. CHI. L. REv. 388, 393 (1952) (although there is no specific
holding of the Illinois Supreme Court, numerous dicta indicate that the rule against con-
tribution is in force, and the state bar takes this view). The Illinois legislature failed
to adopt a contribution statute recommended by the 'Chicago Bar Association. 30 CHI.
B. REc. 394 (1949).
62. See notes 6-14 supra and accompanying text.
63. See notes 15-21 supra and accompanying text.
If indemnity is permitted in collision cases, victim compensation can be expedited by
denying the separate entry of final judgment on a cross-claim. Such entry permits a
separate appeal on the cross-claim, which delays trial of the plaintiff's claim, and there-
fore his reimbursement for medical and legal expenses, pending appellate review. To
implement the objective of speedy relief, the appellate court should remand with orders
to reduce the lower-court holding on the cross-claim to interlocutory status. Panichella
v. Pennsylvania R.R., 252 F.2d 452 (3d Cir. 1958) ; 3 Moopx, FEDERAL PRACTICE 11 13.38
(2d ed. 1948) ("[S~ound judicial administration demands that the power [to allow
separate appeal prior to the adjudication of all claims presented in an action] be rarely
used.").
64. See notes 7-9 supra and accompanying text.
For criticism of past attempts to allocate total liability on the basis of degrees of
negligence, see Green, Illinois Negligence Law, 39 ILL. L. REV. 36, 49-54 (!944) ; Elliott,
Degrees of Negligence, 6 So. CAL. L. REV. 91, 141 ('1933). Today, the principal remain-
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"passive" test usually becomes a search for the more reprehensible, better
insured, or more solvent defendant.65 Thus, the entire burden is thrust upon
one tortfeasor who is only slightly more (or, perhaps, less) at fault than his
cotortfeasor. Furthermore, the difficulty of defining "active" and "passive"
promotes uncertainty for litigants and leads to an unnecessary multiplication
of claims and appeals.6 6 Equal contribution, on the other hand, though a rigid
standard for dividing losses, is a more practicable approach than indemnity-
and more likely to produce damages reflecting the culpability of the parties. 7
Moreover, even if the "active"-"passive" test could be applied with precision,
indemnity would not implement the fault principle as effectively as those con-
tribution statutes which require the apportionment of damages in accordance
with relative degrees of fault.
Besides urging that indemnity doctrine should not be applied in collision
cases generally, the driver in Shapiro argued that the willful-and-wanton
misconduct criterion of the Illinois guest statute precluded classifying him as
an indemnitor. 68 Otherwise, the driver-host observed, the railroad could re-
cover from him for less than the statutory degree of negligence. The driver's
contention appears sound. The Illinois legislature has given automobile hosts
ing standards requiring determination of degrees of negligence are the automobile guest
statutes, critically viewed at notes 73-78 infra and accompanying text. See 2 HARPER &
JAmEs, ToRTs § 16.13, at 946 (1956). Under maritime law, if one vessel is grossly neg-
ligent while the other is at fault only in some technical sense, the entire loss from a
collision may be shifted to the former under the "major-minor fault" rule. But this rule
has been criticized as "vague and unreliable" and is often circumvented. GILMoRE &
BLACK, ADmiRLTr 403 (1957).
Distinction must be drawn between standards of degrees of negligence governing total
liability and allocation of damages on the basis of relative degrees of fault as is required
under comparative-negligence and some contribution statutes. Green, Illinois Negligence
Law, 39 ILL. L. REv. 36, 47 (1944).
65. See, e.g., Ryan Stevedoring Co. v. Pan-Atlantic S.S. Corp., 350 U.S. 124, 142
(1956) (dissenting opinion) ("[T]he 'primary' or 'active' wrongdoer apparently . . .
[means] the wrongdoer the court deems to be the most negligent.") ; cases cited note 57
supra; Meriam & Thornton, supra note 57, at 861 ("[T]he basic policy inquiry in all
[indemnity] cases has been: 'Who in fairness and equity is at fault here?'").
66. See Davis, supra note 29, at 539-44; Thornton & McNiece, Torts and Work-
nen's Compensation, 32 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1465, 1471 (1957) ("[I]n deciding what negli-
gence is 'active' and what is 'passive,' a trial judge will receive almost as much assist-
ance from tossing a coin as he will from pondering the opinions of the appellate tribu-
nals."); N.Y. LAW REvnsioN COMe'N, REPoar, REcom MENDAnONS AND STUDnIS 19
(1952) ("No clear lines of distinction are provided by the reported decisions for predict-
ing the result. Since the rule of indemnity shifts the whole burden of the liability, there
is a strong incentive for litigation.").
67. See Bohlen, Contribution and Indemznity Between Tortfeasors, 22 CORNELL L.O.
469 (1937) ("[O]ne of the unfortunate results of the denial of the right to contribution
... has been the overallowance of indemnity in cases in which there is no great disparity
between their responsibilities."); RESTATEMENT, RsTTUioN, Reporters' Notes 163
(1937).
68. The statute is quoted note 37 supra.
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a protection which seems paramount as compared to the judicial doctrine of
indemnity. At least in the absence of a host's willful and wanton negligence,
guest statutes are usually interpreted to bar a joint tortfeasor, found liable
to an automobile guest, from imposing contribution on the host.0 9 Indemnity
actions against a host should be similarly disallowed.
Moreover, wanton and willful misconduct should not evoke indemnity on
behalf of one who has been "actively" negligent. The Shapiro court evaded
this issue on the ground that Illinois law contained no direct "support" for
causing willful or wanton tortfeasors to indemnify "active" cotortfeasors.70
But the question was one of first impression in Illinois ;71 hence, according
69. Lutz v. Boltz, 48 Del. (9 Terry) 197, 100 A.2d 647 (Super. Ct. 1953) ; Mitchell
v. Gooch, 210 S.W.2d 834 (Tex. Civ. App. 1948); Hill Hardware Corp. v. Hesson, 198
Va. 425, 94 S.E.2d 256 (1956); cf. Kauth v. Landsverk, 224 Wis. 554, 271 N.W. 841
(1937).
This position is consistent with that taken with respect to other individual defenses
against tort liability and the use of contribution to dilute their effect. Thus, in most
American jurisdictions, family relationships also bar an action for contribution by a tort-
feasor against a joint tortfeasor related to the injured party. Yellow Cab Co. v. Dreslin,
181 F.2d 626 (D.C. Cir. 1950) (husband-wife); Zutter v. O'Connell, 200 Wis. 601, 229
N.W. 73 (1930) (parent-child); Annot, 19 A.L.R.2d 1003 (1951) (collecting cases).
The Pennsylvania courts, which alone refuse to accept a family relationship as a bar to
contribution, view contribution as the enforcement of an "equitable duty to share lia-
bility" rather than as a means of recovering for a tort. Puller v. Puller, 380 Pa. 219,
110 A.2d 175 (1955) (husband-wife).
Comparable treatment of the individual defense has developed independently abroad.
In England, the husband-wife relationship bars recovery from a spouse of the injured
party under the English contribution statute. Cf. Chant v. Read, [1939] 2 K.B. 346. This
rule has been criticized in WILLIAmS, JOINT TORTS AND CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE 103-
08 (1951). In France, a tortfeasor has been barred from obtaining contribution from the
injured party's host unless the rigid standards of proof imposed by the host-guest rela-
tionship are met. Note, 54 REUE TRiMESTRIELLE DE DROIT CIvIL 129 (1956).
70. 256 F.2d at 19; see note 44 supra and accompanying text.
71. Also, the question has seldom been raised in other jurisdictions. The only case
found dealing with it is Mitchell v. Gooch, 210 S.W.2d 834 (Tex. Civ. App. 1.948)
(dictum) (contribution or indemnity is available if the host is proved grossly negligent
as prescribed by Texas guest statute). True, Dean Prosser states that there is "consider-
able authority ... that one who has been merely negligent may obtain . .. [indemnity]
from another who has been guilty of intentionally wrongful or reckless conduct." PRos-
SER, TORTS 251 (2d ed. 1955). But only two cases are cited to support this proposition:
Missouri, K. & T. Ry. v. Missouri Pac. Ry., 103 Kan. 1, 175 Pac. 97 (1918), and Illi-
nois Cent. R.R. v. Louisville Bridge Co., 171 Ky. 445, 188 S.W. 476 (1916). The former
contains at best pertinent. dictum; the latter is not on point. RESTATEMENT, RESTITUTION
§ 97 (1937)- takes a position similar to that of Prosser.: a "negligent" tortfeasor should
be indemnified by a "reckless or intentionally wrongful" tortfeasor when the latter "knew
of the peril and could have averted the harm at a time when the negligent tortfeasor
could not have done so." The reporter's notes to the section cite several early cases in
which an action for indemnity was allowed against a negligent tortfeasor with the "last
clear chance"; however, the notes do not refer to any cases in which the indemnitor was
reckless or intentionally wrongful, with the doubtful exception of the Missouri, K. & T.
Ry. case, supra, also cited by Prosser. RESTATEMENT, REs~iTuTION, Reporters' Notes
162-64 (1937).
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to accepted practice, the Seventh Circuit should have faced it.72 So doing,
the court would have found that, in Illinois (as in most states having guest
statutes) ,7 the measure of misconduct which renders a host liable to his
passengers is so ill-defined as to defy rational application.74 While volition
is supposedly an element of willfulness and wantonness, 75 it commonly may
be inferred from surrounding circumstances. 76 As a result, the guest-statute
72. Under the rule of Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), a federal court
is obliged to assume the role of a state court when no state precedent exists. "Meredith
v. Winter Haven, 320 U.S. 228, 237 (1943). The Seventh Circuit has not been reticent
in the past about breaking new ground under Erie-Tompkins. E.g., Daily v. Parker,
152 F.2d 174, 177 (7th Cir. 1945). Other federal courts have developed contribution and
indemnity rules in states where the state courts have not yet acted. E.g., Slattery v.
Marra Bros., 186 F.2d 134, 139 (2d Cir. 1951) (N.J. law).
73. Twenty-nine states now have guest statutes or common-law equivalents. Com-
ment, 5 KAN. L. REv. 722 (1957) (collecting statutes). The statutes were enacted in the
1920's and 1930's with strong backing from insurance companies desirous of preventing
collusive suits. Georgetta, The Major Issues in a Guest Case, 1954 INs. L.J. 583, 584.
The statutes also reflect the notions that a guest has assumed the risk of ordinary neg-
ligence by his host, and that he should not be so ungrateful as to "bite the hand that
feeds him." Crawford v. Foster, 110 Cal. App. 81, 87, 293 Pac. 841, 843 (1930). The
latter argument breaks down, however, when the host is insured.
Somewhat equivalent treatment is accorded the host-guest relationship under the civil
law in France. See 2 MAZEAUD, MAZEAUD & TUNC, op. cit. supra note 3, §§ 1278, 1273
n.l. In England, however, the host receives no such protection. Nevertheless, the guest-
statute rationale is reflected in English compulsory-insurance legislation, which exempts
the gratuitous passenger from the host's required coverage. Comnpensation for Accidents,
102 SOL. J. 729, 783 (1958).
74. See 2 HARPER & JAM.EIs, TORTS § 16.15, at 952 (1956) ("Disagreement and con-
fusion have marked judicial attempts to define [the terms of the guest statutes], even
within a single jurisdiction.") ; Huff, Basis of Liability in Automobile Cases, 1953 U.
ILL. L.F. 28, 39, 41 ("Definition of the term 'wilful and wanton misconduct' [in the
Illinois guest statute] has given rise to double-talk unsurpassed in any field of the law.
* * . It is hopeless to try to reconcile the decisions upon a factual basis."). For other
commentators attacking the vague standards and conflicting results under the guest stat-
utes of their jurisdictions, see Silliman, Standard of Care Under the Florida Guest Stat-
utte, 27 FLA. B.J. 298 (1953) ; Comment, 5 KAN. L. RE,. 722 (1957) ; Note, 33 ORE. L.
Ray. 216 (1954) ; Note, 42 VA. L. REv. 97 (1956) ; Note, 8 W. RES. L. Ray. 170 (1957).
But see Note, 55 MicH. L. REv. 1197-98 (1957) ("A notable harmony among the state
courts both as to approach and outcome has resulted, despite the variety of descriptions
of culpable negligence.").
75. PaossER, ToRTs 150-52 (2d ed. 1955); Note, 33 ORE. L. REv. 216, 223 (1954)
(most cases holding the host liable "seem to indicate volitional, rather than inadvertent,
conduct"). The volitional element is usually found in the requirement that defendant
subjectively know of actual or impending danger and fail to exercise due care after
apprehension of that danger. E.g., Schneiderman v. Interstate Transit Lines, Inc., 394
Ill. 569, 583, 69 N.E.2d 293, 300 (1946) ; Note, 55 MicH. L. REv. 1197, 1198-99 (1957);
Note, 42 VA. L. REv. 97, 107 (1957).
76. E.g., Long v. Foley, 180 Kan. 83, 90-91, 299 P.2d 63, 69 (1956); Tighe v. Dia-
mond, 149 Ohio St. 520, 527, 80 N.E.2d 122, 127 (1948) ; Turner v. McCready, 190 Ore.
28, 54, 222 P.2d 1010, 1021-22 (1950); Comment, 5 KAN. L. REv. 722, 732 (1957).
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standard is often relaxed,77 especially since the host is normally assumed to
be insured.73 Consequently, like the "active"-"passive" test, guest statutes
frequently yield unpredictable results unrelated to moral blameworthiness.
The distinction between a willful and wanton indemnitor and an "actively"
negligent indemnitee is therefore likely to prove as unsatisfactory as that be-
tween "active" and "passive" joint tortfeasors. In sum, the courts should not
allow indemnity in collision cases. It subverts the policy of states such as Illi-
nois which would de-emphasize moral fault. And, as a means of allocating
loss in accordance with relative degrees of fault, it is inferior to equal or
apportioned contribution.
77. E.g., Hering v. Hilton, 12 Ill. 2d 559, 147 N.E.2d 311 (1958) (mistake in judg-
ment in crossing intersection held willful and wanton) ; Marks v. Marks, 303 Ill. App.
276, 31 N.E.2d 399 (1941) (driver who fell asleep willful and wanton); Comment, 5
KAN. L. REv. 722, 733 (1957) (trend toward more recovery by plaintiffs). But see
Mundt, The South Dakota Autonwbile Guest Statute, 2 S.D.L. REV. 70 (1957) (statute
too harsh on plaintiffs). It may be reasonably assumed -that the tendency toward diluting
fault requirements in deference to considerations of loss distribution and victim com-
pensation in collision cases, note 5 supra, has carried over into the guest-statute cases.
See Huff, Basis of Liability in. Autontwbile Cases, 1953 U. Im. LYF. 28, 51 (Under Illi-
nois guest statute "consideration of the question of injury and a feeling that the burden
of decisions adverse to the defendant will be borne by insurers has brought about the
relaxation of rules which would restrict recovery.").
78. McCoMnic, EVIDENcE 357 (1954) ("In nearly all cases the jury will either be
informed of the fact of insurance or will consciously assume that the defendant is so
protected.") ; Huff, supra note 77.
APENDIX I
A. The following five jurisdictions allow an action for contribution from a joint tort-
feasor, whether joined by the plaintiff or not, and apportion damages among joint tort-
feasors in accordance with their relative degrees of fault.
1. Arkansas: ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 34-1001 to -1009 (1947).
2. Delaware: D.. CODE ANN. tit. 10, §§ 6301-08 (1953). Delaware has reputedly
amended its statute to limit contribution to tortfeasors joined by the plaintiff. 9 U.L.A.
19 (Supp. 1958). But the amendment is not contained in the 1958 supplement to the
Delaware Code.
3. Hawaii: HAWAII REv. LAws §§ 10-16 (1955).
4. Iowa: Best v. Yerkes, 247 Iowa 800, 77 N.W.2d 23 (1956) (dictum) ("equitable"
contribution permitted); Chicago Gt. West. Ry. v. Farmers Produce Co., 164 F. Supp.
532, 537 (N.D. Iowa 1958) (dictum) ; Note, 6 DRAKE L. RE:v. 30, 36 (1956) ; Comment,
42 IowA L. REv. 450 (1957). Whether Iowa will allow contribution by apportionment
or in equal shares is not clear; use of the term "equitable" implies the former.
5. South Dakota: S.D. CODE §§ 33.04A01-.04A10 (Supp. 1952).
B. The following fourteen jurisdictions allow an action for contribution from a joint
tortfeasor, whether joined by the plaintiff or not, and require that such an action result
in equally divided damages.
1. District of Columbia: Knell v. Feltman, 174 F.2d 662 (D.C. Cir. 1949).
2. Kentucky: Ky. Ray. STAT. § 412.030 (1955) (if tort involves no moral turpitude).
3. Maryland: Mn. ANN. CODE art. 50, §§ 16-24 (1957).
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4. Minnesota: Underwriters at Lloyds v. Smith, 166 Minn. 388, 208 N.W. 13 (1-926) ;
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 548.19 (1946) (procedural statute applicable to judgment debtors).
5. New Jersey: N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:53A(1)-(5) (1952).
6. New Mexico: N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 24-1-11 to -16 (1953).
7. North Carolina: N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 1-240 (1953).
8. North Dakota: N.D. Laws 1957, ch. 223, §§ 1-5.
9. Pennsylvania: PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, §§ 2082-89 (Supp. 1958).
10. Rhode Island: R.I. GEN. LAws §§ 10-64 to -11 (1956).
11. Tennessee: American Cas. Co. v. Billingsley, 195 Tenn. 448, 260 S.W.2d 173
(Tenn. 1953) (provided would-be indemnitee is guilty of "passive" negligence and other
joint tortfeasor of "active" negligence). The authorities cited by the Tennessee court in
adopting this rule are indemnity cases and indicate that such adoption results from a
confusion of the indemnity and contribution concepts. Cohen v. Noel, 165 Tenn. 600, 56
S.W.2d 7-44 (1933). For a criticism of the "active'-"passive" limitation, see Note, 23
U. CiNc. L. REv. 121 (1954).
12. Texas: TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 2212 (1950); Union Bus Lines v. Byrd,
142 Tex. 257, 177 S.W.2d 774 (1944).
13. Virginia: VA. CODE ANN. § 8-627 (1950) (if tort involves no moral turpitude).
14. Wisconsin: Mitchell v. Raymond, 181 Wis. 591, 195 N.W. 855 (1923).
C. The following eight jurisdictions allow an action for contribution only from a joint
tortfeasor joined by the plaintiff. Contribution must result in equally divided damages.
1. Georgia: GA. CODE ANN. §§ 105-2011 to -2012 (1956).
2. Louisiana: LA. Civ. CoDE ANN. arts. 2103-05 (1952); Quatray v. Wicker, 178
La. 289, 151 So. 208 (1933) ; Linkenhorger v. Owens, 181 F.2d 97 (5th Cir. 1950).
3. Maine: Hobbs v. Hurley, 117 Me. 449, 104 At. 815 (1918). This decision, which
apparently has not been tested further by an appellate court, may be extended to permit
contributions against tortfeasors not joined by the plaintiff.
4. Michigan: MicH. STAT. ANN. §§ 27.1683(1)-(4) (Supp. 1957).
5. Mississippi: Miss. CODE ANN. § 335.5 (1957).
6. Missouri: Mo. ANN. STAT. § 537.060 (1953).
7. New York: N.Y. Civ. Pac. ACT § 211-a.
8. West Virginia: W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 5481-82 (1958).
D. The following twenty-four jurisdictions retain the common-law rule against contri-
bution.
Alabama Florida Montana Oregon
Alaska Idaho Nebraska South Carolina
Arizona Illinois Nevada Utah
California Indiana New Hampshire Vermont
Colorado Kansas Ohio Washington
Connecticut Massachusetts Oklahoma Wyoming
APPENDIX II
Cases collected in the SIXTH DEC. DIG. 1946-56 (1957) and 1-7 WEST'S GENERAL
DIGEST (3d Ser. 1958) under Indemnity §§ 13(1)-(2) indicate that indemnity has been
allowed most often in the following situations, in descending order of frequency.
A. An owner or controller of premises, previously held liable to third parties for
the condition of the premises, is allowed indemnity from the party actually creating the
dangerous condition (independent contractor, tenant, owner of easement, etc.). Leading
early cases are Gray v. Boston Gas Light Co., 114 Mass. 149 (1873); Oceanic Steam
Nay. Co. v. Compania Transatlantica Espanola, 134 N.Y. 461, 31 N.E. 987 (1892);
George A. Fuller Co. v. Otis Elevator Co., 245 U.S. 489 (1918). For a more recent case,
see, e.g., Barb v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 281 S.W.2d 297 (Mo. 1955).
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B. An employer held liable to his employees for failing to provide a safe place to
work is allowed indemnity from the party actually causing the injury to an employee.
Leading early cases are Boston Woven Hose & Rubber Co. v. Kendall, 178 Mass. 232,
59 N.E. 657 (1901); Standard Oil Co. v. Robins Dry Dock & Repair Co., 32 F.2d 182
(2d Cir. 1929). For recent cases, see, e.g., Pennsylvania R.R. v. McAllister Lighterage
Line, Inc., 240 F.2d 423 (2d Cir. 1957); Kozman v. Trans World Airlines, 236 F.2d
527 (2d Cir. 1956); Chicago R.I. & Pac. Ry. v. United States, 220 F.2d 939 (7th Cir.
1955).
C. A master or principal held liable to third parties under the respondeat superior
doctrine is allowed indemnity from his servant or agent actually causing the damage.
Canadian Indem. Co. v. U. S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 213 F.2d 658 (9th Cir. 1954) ; Thomas
v. Malco Refineries, Inc., 214 F.2d 884, 886 (10th Cir. 1954). But see United States v.
Gilman, 347 U.S. 507 (1954) (when sued under the Federal Tort Claims Act, the United
States may not implead a government employee for indemnity). Indemnity in the master-
servant situation has been strongly criticized because of its disastrous effect on loss dis-
tribution and because such indemnity subverts the policy behind respondeat superior.
James, Contribution, Indemnity and Subrogatiom and the Efficient Distribution of Acci-
dent Losses, 21 NACCA L.J. 360, 369 (1958); Steffens, The Employer's "Indemnity"
Action, 25 U. Cnl. L. REv. 465 (1958); Williams, Vicarious Liability and the Master's
Indemnity, 20 MODERN L. REv. 220 (1957); Note, 63 YALE L.J. 570 (1954). The num-
ber of employer indemnity actions against employees is increasing. Some thirty such
cases, commonly brought by the employer's insurer, have reached state appellate and
federal courts since 1946. SIXTH DEc. DIG. and WEs 'S GENERAL DIGEST, supra.
D. A municipality held liable for the condition of its public ways is allowed indemnity
from the adjoining property owner or party actually creating the defective condition.
Leading early cases are Lowell v. Boston & L.R.R., 40 Mass. (23 Pick.) 24 (1839);
Washington Gas Light Co. v. District of Columbia, 161 U.S. 316 (1896). For a recent
decision, see, e.g., City and County of San Francisco v. Ho Sing, 330 P.2d 802 (Cal.
1958).
E. A user of chattel held liable to third parties for a defective condition is allowed
indemnity from the supplier. Blair v. Cleveland Twist Drill Co., 197 F.2d 842 (7th Cir.
1952) ; Crouse v. Wilbur-Ellis Co., 77 Ariz. 359, 272 P.2d 352 (1954) ; McFall v. Coin-
pagnie Maritime Beige, 304 N.Y. 314, 107 N.E.2d 463 (1952).
F. The bailor of an automobile held liable to third parties under an automobile
"consent" statute is allowed indemnity from the bailee. Lunderberg v. Bierman, 241 Minn.
349, 63 N.W.2d 355 (1954); Traub v. Dinzler, 309 N.Y. 395, 131 N.E.2d 564 (1955).
G. A freight forwarder held liable to the shipper is allowed indemnity from a sub-
sequent carrier actually causing damage to the freight. Orlove v. Philippine Air Lines,
Inc., 257 F.2d 384 (2d Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 909 (1958) ; Merchant Shippers
Ass'n v. Kellogg Express & Draying Co., 170 P.2d 923, 28 Cal. 2d 594 (1946).
APPENDIX III
A. Indemnity has been denied in collision cases in the following seventeen juris-
dictions.
1. Califoria: Adams v. White Bus Line, 184 Cal. 710, 195 Pac. 389 (1921) (a con-
tribution case generally cited as denying indemnity as well, 26 Cal. Jur. 2d 348 (1956)).
See also Smith v. Fall River Joint Union High School Dist., 1 Cal. 2d 331, 335, 34 P.2d
994, 996 (1934) ; Guy F. Atkinson Co. v. Merritt, Chapman & Scott Corp., 141 F. Supp.
833, 836 (N.D. Calif. 1956).
2. District of Columbia: Warner v. Capital Transit Co., 162 F. Supp. 253 (D.D.C,
1958).
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3. Illinois: Shapiro v. Gulf, M. & O.R.R., 256 F.2d 193 (7th Cir. 1958). But cf.
Gulf, M. & O.R.R. v. Arthur Dixon Transfer Co., 343 111. App. 148, 98 N.E.2d 783
(1951).
4. Indiana: Roth v. Greyhound Corp., 149 F. Supp. 454 (E.D. Pa. 1957).
5. Iowa: Bolton v. Ziegler, 1-11 F. Supp. 516 (N.D. Iowa 1953). But cf. Best v.
Yerkes, 247 Iowa 800, 807, 77 N.W.2d 23, 29 (1956).
6. Kentucky: Bache v. Dixie-Ohio Express Co., 8 F.R.D. 159 (N.D. Ga. 1948).
But cf. Middlesboro Home Tel. Co. v. Louisville & N.R.R., 214 Ky. 822, 284 S.W. 104
(1926).
7. Louisiana: Toye Bros. Yellow Cab Co. v. V-8 Cab Co., 18 So. 2d 514 (La. 1944):
cf. United Gas Corp. v. Guillory, 206 F.2d 49 (5th Cir. 1953).
8. Michigan: Lowe v. New York Cent. R.R., 148 F. Supp. 337 (E.D. Mich. 1957).
9. Missouri: State ex rel. Seigel v. McLaughlin, 315 S.W.2d 499 (Mo. Ct. App.
1958).
10. New Hampshire: Scahill v. Miniter, 101 N.H. 56, 132 A.2d 140 (1957). For an
earlier case allowing indemnity in a collision situation on a "last clear chance" analysis,
see Nashua Iron & Steel Co. v. Worcester & N.R.R., 62 N.H. 159 (1882).
11. New Jersey: Sientki v. Haffner, 145 F. Supp. 435 (S.D.N.Y. 1956).
12. New Mexico: Krametbauer v. McDonald, 44 N.M. 473, 104 P.2d 900 (1940).
13. New York: Anderson v. Liberty Fast Freight Co., 285 App. Div. 44, 135 N.Y.S.
2d 559 (1954); Messaro v. Long Island R.R., 274 App. Div. 939, 83 N.Y.S.2d 527
(1948); Levinson v. Levine, 142 N.Y.S.2d 213 (Sup. Ct. 1955); Bueno v. National
Transp. Co., 125 N.Y.S.2d 310 (Sup. Ct. 1953); cf. Kennedy v. Bethlehem Steel Co.,
282 App. Div. 1001, 125 N.Y.S.2d 552 (1953). But cf. Knippenberg v. Lord & Taylor,
193 App. Div. 753, 184 N.Y. Supp. 785 (1920).
14. North Carolina: Kimsey v. Reaves, 242 N.C. 721, 89 S.E.2d 386 (1955).
15. Ohio: Fidelity & Cas. Co. v. Federal Express, Inc., 136 F.2d 35 (6th Cir. 1943)
Builders Supply Co. v. McCabe, 366 Pa. 322, 77 A.2d 368 (1951).
16. South Carolina: Hills v. Price, 79 F. Supp. 494 (E.D.S.C. 1948).
17. Washington: Duncan v. Judge, 43 Wash. 2d 836, 264 P.2d 865 (1953). But cf.
Snohomish County v. Great No. Ry., 130 F.2d 996 (9th Cir. 1942).
The following decisions indicate that indemnity might not be allowed in a collision
case: American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. v. Jarvis, 112 F. Supp. 276, 278 (D. Conn. 1953)
(Connecticut) ; Central of Ga. Ry. v. Macon Ry. & Light Co., 9 Ga. App. 628, 71 S.E.
1076 (1911) (Georgia) ; Maryland Cas. Co. v. Paton, 194 F.2d 765 (9th Cir. 1952)
(Oregon).
B. Indemnity has been explicitly allowed in collision cases only in:
Colorado: Colorado & So. Ry. v. Western Light & Power Co., 73 Colo. 107, 214 Pac.
30 (1.923) ; Parrish v. De Remer, 117 Colo. 256, 187 P.2d 597 (1947) ; Hamblen v. Santa
Fe Trail Transp. Co., 101 F. Supp. 799, 800 (D. Colo. 1951) (dictum).
The following decisions indicate that indemnity might be allowed in a collision case:
Chicago Gt. West. Ry. Co. v. Casura, 234 F.2d 441 (Sth Cir. 1956) (Minnesota);
Waylander-Peterson Co. v. Great No. Ry., 201 F.2d 408 (8th Cir. 1953) (Minnesota);
Central Sur. & Ins. Corp. v. Mississippi Export R.R., 91 F.2d 125 (5th Cir. 1937) (Mis-
sissippi) ; United States v. Savage Truck Line, 209 F.2d 442 (4th Cir. 1953), cert. denied,
347 U.S. 952 (1954) (Virginia).
C. The status of indemnity in collision cases appears uncertain in Texas: Wheeler
v. Glazer, 137 Tex. 341, 153 S.W.2d 449 ('1941) (allowing indemnity); cf. Humble Oil
& Ref. Co. v. Martin, 148 Tex. 175, 222 S.W.2d 995 (1949). Indemnity was denied in
Ft. Worth & D. Ry. v. Threadgill, 228 F.2d 307 (5th Cir. 1955); Brown & Root, Inc.
v. United States, 198 F.2d 138 (5th Cir. 1952). For a discussion of the earlier Texas
cases see HODGES, op. cit. supra note 55.
